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An experiment was conducted in a driving simulator to test how eye-movement pat-
terns evolve over time according to the decision-making processes involved in a driv-
ing task. Participants had to drive up to a crossroads and decide to stop or not. The
decision-making task was considered as the succession of two phases associated with
cognitive processes: Differentiation (leading to a prior decision) and Consolidation
(leading to a final decision). Road signs (Stop, Priority and GiveWay) varied across
situations, and the stopping behavior (Go and NoGo) was recorded. Saccade ampli-
tudes and fixation durations were analyzed. Specific patterns were found for each
condition in accordance with the associated processes: high visual exploration (larger
saccade amplitudes and shorter fixation durations) for the Differentiation phase, and
lower visual exploration (smaller saccades and longer fixations) for the Consolida-
tion phase. These results support that eye-movements can provide good indices of
underlying processes occurring during a decision-making task in an everyday context.
Keywords: visual attention, decision making, saccade amplitude, fixation
duration, driving
Introduction
Visual attention is characterized by two types of pro-
cessing: bottom-up processing is related to the visual
characteristics of the scene, and may be modeled by
saliency maps (Itti & Koch, 2001; Koch & Ullman, 1985;
Follet et al., 2010; Bruce & Tsotsos, 2009); top-down
processing depends on prior knowledge, goals and ex-
pectancies (Sprague & Ballard, 2003; Summerfield &
Egner, 2009). Top-down processing is known to have
a strong influence on eye movement (Howard et al.,
2011; Hayhoe & Ballard, 2005; Land, 2004; Hayhoe et
al., 2003; Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999; Land et al.,
1999; Ballard et al., 1995; Land & Lee, 1994), which is
supported by research on neural mechanisms (Li et al.,
2004), while bottom-up processing poorly predicts eye
movements in everyday tasks (Rothkopf et al., 2007).
Since Yarbus (1967), a number of authors have demon-
strated that oculomotor patterns depend on the task
(Lipps & Pelz, 2004; Tatler et al., 2011). Most of these
studies have collected eye movements in laboratory
conditions, which restrict the generalization of these
observations to ecological and complex situations (e.g.
driving, playing sports, shopping, serving tea).
Previous studies have considered static tasks, in the
sense that task requirement itself does not change dur-
ing execution. Consequently, such studies do not re-
veal possible qualitative changes in gaze patterns over
task phases (however, see Ballard et al. (1992, 1995);
Mennie et al. (2007), who studied dynamic tasks). It
is interesting to test whether it is possible to discrimi-
nate different task phases during the course of the task.
In addition, in most studies, the decision-making tasks
performed by the participants weremanipulated by ex-
plicit instructions (e.g. lane changing, gap judgment
in driving); and these tasks were clearly distinct from
one another (e.g. Yarbus’ experiment: give the age, re-
member the clothes or the position of people, estimate
material circumstances, etc.). This raises the question
whether it is possible to discriminate between the men-
tal states underlying an ongoing task, without chang-
ing the stimulus or instruction. Indeed, it would be
valuable for everyday eye movement studies.
For these reasons, this paper is focused on the cog-
nitive processes which contribute to the task, and their
relationship with eye movements. We have chosen a
decision-making task, which consists of two consecu-
tive processes, in a sequential temporal structure. The
experimental situation was a crossroads approach in a
driving simulator, the decision was to stop or not. Is
it possible to discriminate, using oculomotor patterns,
the different cognitive processes involved in distinct
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task phases, and to investigate whether these patterns
change over time?
Decision making and temporal evolution
In everyday situations, decisions are not always op-
timal under time pressure. Even if a first decision is
made, allowing the appropriate action to start, visual
control may be needed in order to check the decision’s
validity until the action is finished. Experimental ev-
idence of visual control in the course of action has
shown for arm and hand movements (e.g. grasping a
static target (Goodale, 2011); intercepting a moving tar-
get (Brenner & Smeets, 2011)), as well as driving (Wallis
et al., 2007).
In the following, we will consider a decision-making
task in a situation with a time course: the decision may
occur before action, so that the first decision may be
reconsidered until the final decision. This latency in-
troduces a time course of decision-making with two
consecutive phases. This type of situation appears in
many real-life situations, but is not considered in most
decision-making models (general: Kahneman (2002);
Eccles & Wigfield (2002); Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier
(2011); perceptual decision: Geisler (2011); Summer-
field et al. (2012); natural tasks: Sprague & Ballard
(2003); under time pressure: Maule et al. (2000); theory
of action: Nenkov & Gollwitzer (2012)). The first deci-
sion is labeled “prior decision”. The phase before this
prior decision correspond to a “Differentiation” pro-
cess (D). During D, the available information is eval-
uated and a prior decision is produced as output. The
phase after this prior decision correspond to a “Con-
solidation” process (C). During C, the prior decision is
checked, decreasing the uncertainty, and leads to a final
decision.
This time course follows the Differentiation and
Consolidation (Diff / Con) theory of decision mak-
ing (Svenson, 1992). The decision-making task is de-
scribed within this framework as a Differentiation pro-
cess followed by a Consolidation process; the latter
strengthens the prior decision with congruent informa-
tion (Svenson et al., 2009). This model mainly focuses
on social psychology aspects of decision making, and
addresses the impact of emotion, stress and attractive-
ness. Despite difference between the original model of
Svenson and its use in a driving context, the vocabulary
(D and C) has been preserved.
In the time course of a decision task, the D process
leads to a prior decision. Its aim is to make the best
possible decisional choice, considering the current situ-
ation. Then, the C process triggers action and validates
(or not) this prior decision. Its aim is to check whether
the current information is consistent, gradually increas-
ing confidence in the prior decision, until the realiza-
tion of the action or until confidence level is considered
sufficient. In the latter case, if a next decision is needed,
a new D process may start (anticipation); otherwise, no
decision-making task (and thus, no D or C process) is
present anymore. In the following, when no decision is
required any more, the current activity is described as
Baseline (B), in contrast to D and C. D and C have cog-
nitive costs associated with the decision-making task
that are added to this baseline, which includes all other
processes potentially at work.
In this study, we will specify the D and C processes
in a specific decision-making task, define their char-
acteristics and those of the associated phases. The
challenging issue will then be to discriminate these
decision-making processes on the basis of specific eye
movement patterns.
The experimental situation: a driver approaching
a crossroads
A number of elements influenced the choice of the
experimental situation. Firstly, this study required
a delay between prior decision and action (in order
to observe C). Moreover, it needed an ecological and
complex situation, a central role of perception, a time
course, andminimal instructions, the same in all condi-
tions. Indeed, the more complex the situation, the less
the gaze is driven by the properties of the visual scene,
via bottom-up processing (Foulsham et al., 2011; Land
& Tatler, 2009). For all these reasons, we have chosen a
driving situation.
The experimental situation needed also to vary the
result of the decision and the time course of the phases
(before and after the prior decision). A behavioral ob-
servation was also needed in order to record the prior
and final decision. The crossroads approach was se-
lected. An important decision has to be made: to stop
or not (NoGo vs. Go). If the final decision is to stop,
a new decision has to be made: when to restart. The
probability of the decision (Go / NoGo) was modu-
lated with the road sign: Stop, Priority and Give Way
(see Fig. 1 for an illustration of the sequential temporal
structure).
In the Stop sign condition, the prior decision NoGo
was imposed by a road sign1. The action does not de-
pend on interaction with others vehicles. The probabil-
ity to have a collision and to change the prior decision
is very low. Therefore, confidence in the prior decision
is high, and the C process is almost not needed. In this
case, the process associated with the decision-making
task is expected to be first B, then D in order to antici-
pate the next decision (when to restart).
In the Priority sign condition, the prior decision Go
was also suggested by the road sign. The action implies
1 In the data analysis, we have considered the last 150 m of
the crossroads approach: the road signs were located at this
distance, which is consistent with the French regulation. At
this point, 150 m before the crossroads, the prior decision has
already been made in the Stop road-sign condition (NoGo)
and in the Priority sign condition (Go), but not in the Give
Way condition (see Fig. 1).
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Figure 1. An approach of a crossroads and the prediction of
cognitive processes. Top: bird’s view of the 150m before the
crossroads; the participant’s car is in red, the traffic cars in
black, and control cars in white (to increase immersion feel-
ing). Bottom: predictions about the prior and final decisions,
and the associated processes fore the three road sign condi-
tions.
some level of collision risk (if other drivers do not re-
spect the priority). When approaching the crossroads,
information about the other driver’s behavior increases
the level of confidence and consolidates the prior deci-
sion. Therefore, the C process is expected.
In the Give Way sign condition, the prior decision is
not obvious, so that the first process is D. Then, if the
prior decision is NoGo, the D process can be replaced
by a new D (anticipation) as in the Stop condition. If
the prior decision is Go, the next process is C as in the
Priority condition.
Cognitive processes and eye movements
Visual search is characterized by scanpaths, result-
ing in sequences of fixations and saccades (Goldberg &
Kotval, 1999). Chapman & Underwood (1998) showed
that fixation durations decrease and saccade ampli-
tudes increase when visual search increases (see also
Rayner (1998); Crundall & Underwood (2011)).
To decide whether to stop or not, saccade ampli-
tudes and fixation durations (visual exploration2) are
related to estimates of speed, distance and gap size
of the oncoming vehicles, based on the information of
color, shape, texture and rate of frontal surface expan-
sion (Hancock et al., 1991). This information is sup-
posed to be shared by both the D and C processes, the
difference between them being the amount of visual ex-
ploration.
To use the vocabulary of Sprague & Ballard (2003),
this information is relevant for the decision making
task, by reducing uncertainty (e.g. depending on the
road sign): “eye movements serve to reduce uncer-
tainty about environmental variables that are relevant
to behavior” (cited from Sprague & Ballard (2003), p.
2). Accordingly, the possibility of decreasing the uncer-
tainty is higher during a D process than during a C pro-
cess, thus visual exploration should be higher during a
D process (i.e. larger saccade amplitudes and shorter
fixation durations). This is consistent with the driver
behavior theory of Na¨a¨ta¨nen & Summala (1974): the
information obtained during the D process modifies
the expectancy, which will be more specific after the
prior decision, during the C process. This supports a
decrease of visual exploration during the C process.
We therefore hypothesized that D, C and Bwould re-
sult in a hierarchy of visual exploration, ranging from
more active in D than in C, and in C than in B. Accord-
ing to this hierarchy, the following predictions may be
expected: fixation durations should be shorter during
D compared to C process, and during C compared to
B; and saccade amplitudes should be higher in a D pro-
cess than in a C process, and in a C process than in a
B.
Figure 2. Prediction of oculomotor pattern during the ap-
proach of the crossroads, starting at 150 m. Top: Relative
predicted value of the saccade amplitudes. Bottom: Relative
predicted value of the fixation durations.
To summarize, we link the level of visual exploration
with the cognitive processes (see Fig. 2 for an illustra-
tion of our oculomotor behavior predictions). The vi-
sual exploration is expected to be low in the beginning
of the Stop condition (B), and then to increase (D pro-
2 “Visual search” is associated in the vision science liter-
ature to a detection task. In order to avoid any confusion
with the visual search involved in the driving task, which is
considered in this study, we use “visual exploration” instead,
to denote the combination of fixation durations and saccade
amplitudes. Thus, a decrease of fixation durations and an in-
crease of saccade amplitudes will be referred to as an increase
of visual exploration.
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cess). Moderate visual exploration is expected in the
beginning of the Priority condition (C process), lower-
ing to a baseline level while evidence is accumulated
for the final decision. In the Give Way condition, a
high visual exploration is expected (D process) until the
prior decision. In the Give Way NoGo condition, this
first phase is followed by a new sequence of high visual
exploration (D process). In the Give Way Go condition,
a moderate visual exploration (C process) is expected
following the prior decision.
Method
Participants
Thirty-four participants (29 men and 5 women) with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, took part in the
experiment. They all had at least three years of driving
experience (M = 15, SD = 12), and their average age was
34 years (SD = 12).
Material
Virtual environment and scenario. The virtual environ-
ment was created with the Realax software. It was dis-
played at scale 1:1, and computed for the viewpoint of
the participant (1.15 m above the simulated ground).
It represented a two-lane highway in a rural environ-
ment, with a simplified landscape which helped to re-
duce bottom-up attention. The road was straight and
crossed a new road at right angle every kilometer. The
crossroads were announced 150 m beforehand with a
road sign (see Fig. 3). The road markings at the cross-
roads were consistent with the road signs.
Figure 3. Road signs used in the experiment, with their vi-
sual representation and meaning, according to French law.
A driving simulator software architecture
(ARCHISIM) was used to introduce traffic in this
virtual environment via two computers. In order to
improve the sense of immersion, some vehicles were
simulated coming along the highway in the opposite
direction. At the crossroads, some vehicles were
simulated on both ways crossed by the driver (see Fig.
1, Top). These vehicles followed the priority rules. In
order to modulate the stopping decision in the Give
Way conditions, three levels of traffic density were
implemented: no vehicle, few vehicles (on average
spaced 45 m from each other), or many vehicles (on
average spaced 22.5 m from each other). The three
levels of traffic density were also present in the Stop
and Priority conditions, to have equivalent visual
environments. In case of collision with other vehicles,
the participant’s car could go through.
Apparatus. The driving simulation experiment (see
Fig. 4) was displayed via two computers and five
video-projectors, on five screens of 1.85 m wide and
2.55 m high (resolution: 10241280 pixels for each
video-projector; response time: 60Hz, consistent with
the 60Hz simulation update rate). The distance be-
tween the participants’ heads and the screens (at 90)
was 1.70 m. All five screens formed together an angle
of 275 (see Fig. 4, right). The simulator included a
gearbox, a wheel with force feedback, three pedals, a
dashboard with speed and engine speed, and a model
of a combustion engine.
Figure 4. The fixed-based driving simulator. Left: lateral
view of the driver equipped with SMI Eye Tracking Glasses;
Middle: view from behind; Right: design of the five screens
around the driver.
The eye tracking system was SMI (SensoMotoric In-
struments) Eye Tracking Glasses (weight: 75 g). It in-
cluded a scene camera (resolution: 1280960 pixels,
24 fps) and two cameras capturing the driver’s gaze
with a tracking range of 80 horizontal and 60 verti-
cal. This system had a gaze position accuracy of 0.5
(according to the manufacturer), and a sampling rate
of 30 Hz. The data was processed using BeGaze (SMI
software, version 3.1.77). The fixations were calculated
with a dispersion based algorithm, whose parameters
were: 80 ms for minimum fixation duration and 100
pixels (4.69) for the maximum dispersion. The sac-
cades were then derived from these fixations. This con-
cerns eye movements relative to the head. Head move-
ments were not recorded, which means that gaze shifts
relative to the scene may have been much larger in am-
plitude.
All computers were synchronized with the Absolute
Time Server software (two for the environment, two for
the simulation and one for the eye tracker).
Procedure
Once the eye tracker was calibrated (with three
points of calibration on anchor locations displayed
on the central screen), the participants ran a learning
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phase to get accustomed to the driving simulator and
to the eye tracking glasses. Then, the main part of the
experiment began. Calibration was checked through-
out the experiment, and corrected when needed. The
participants’ task was to drive straight and to cross the
crossroads, while taking the road signs into account
and avoiding accidents. The instruction was to drive as
they would on the same road in reality. The experiment
consisted of 45 counter-balanced trials (3 road signs,
3 traffic levels and 5 repetitions), divided up in three
blocks (mean duration per block = 17’26”, SD=3’46”).
After the experiment, the calibration of the eye tracker
was checked again. The experiment lasted about one
hour.
Analysis
The hypotheses focused on the crossroads approach.
Therefore, the analyses were restricted to the last 150 m
before the crossroads. The oculomotor variables were
the fixation durations and the saccade amplitudes. In
addition to mean values, our hypotheses were also
tested on the slope (mean increase/decrease rate of the
saccade amplitudes and fixation durations with respect
to the distance to the crossroads). These slopes relate
closely to the evolution of the processes over time.
To test our predictions about eye movements with
respect to the processes of the decision-making task,
preliminary analyses were needed to construct two fac-
tors: the Driving Situation and the Position.
The Driving Situation factor describes the various
situations the driver could be in during the time course
of the crossroads approach (see Fig. 1). It depends
on the anticipated stopping behavior3 and on the road
sign. ANoGo behavior was expected in the Stop condi-
tion and a Go behavior in the Priority condition. In the
GiveWay conditions, the Go and NoGo behaviors (and
the associated processes) were both expected. In or-
der to get both decisions, three levels of traffic density
were encountered, with “no vehicle” to induce mainly
a Go behavior, “many vehicles” to induce mainly a
NoGo behavior and “few vehicles” to induce both. The
modalities of the Driving Situation factor were Stop
with NoGo behavior, Priority with Go behavior, Give
Way with Go and with NoGo behavior (GW-Go and
GW-NoGo). A descriptive analysis was conducted in
order to control that the road sign and traffic density
induced the expected stopping behavior, and that the
Driving Situation factor makes sense.
The Position factor describes the two phases, Before
and After the prior decision in the Give Way condition.
It depends on the moment of this prior decision. To
identify this moment, the data was cut into 10 road seg-
ments depending on the driver’s position with respect
to the crossroads. Each road segment had a length of
15 m. We postulated that when the driver accelerates
significantly in the GW-Go conditions, the prior deci-
sion has been made. Thus, it was possible to estimate
where the data should be split into two road sections,
Before and After this prior decision. Newman-Keuls
tests were used to determine significant changes in the
gas pedal data comparing the 10 road segments with
each other.
Then, the same split was applied to the other con-
ditions, to obtain two data subsets, Before the prior
decision with three modalities of the Driving Situa-
tion (Give Way, Stop and Priority) and After with four
modalities (GW-Go, GW-NoGo, Stop and Priority). For
each section, Before and After, two one-factor analyses
of variance (ANOVA) were computed on mean values,
two more on slopes.
All fixation durations and saccade amplitudes
greater than the mean value plus 2SD were filtered
out (respectively above 0.8s and above 52.28), which
removed 4.07% of fixation data and 5.26% of saccade
data. The saccade amplitudes were not normally dis-
tributed. A logarithmic transform was applied before
statistical analysis, leading to a normal distribution.
The significance level was set to .05, but, in order to
be consistent with Johnson (2013), p-values are given
when p>.001.
Results
Preliminary analyses
We wanted to link the level of visual exploration
with the cognitive processes (D, C and B) associated
with a decision-making task (see Fig. 1 and 2). For this,
two factors were defined. The first one was the Driving
Situation, with GiveWay (conditionally to the prior de-
cision: Go or NoGo), Stop and Priority conditions. The
second factor was the Position at the crossroads, Before
and After the Go/NoGo prior decision in the GiveWay
condition.
The Driving Situation factor. The expected link was
checked between, on the one hand, the Driving Situa-
tion factor and on the other hand, the stopping behav-
ior, the road sign and the traffic density (see Tab. 1).
As expected, there was no stop behavior in the Prior-
ity condition. In some trials, participants did not stop
in the Stop condition (13 trials out of 483); these trials
were removed from the analysis. In the Give Way con-
dition, there were 216 trials with stop behavior and 274
with no-stop behavior. These values are of the same
order of magnitude and are clearly related to the traf-
fic density, showing that modulating the traffic density
resulted in two sets of decision, Go and NoGo, with
roughly the same size.
The Position factor. Newman-Keuls tests were con-
ducted in order to compare the mean gas pedal accel-
eration, for all pairs of 15 m road segments, in the GW-
3 The stopping behavior was annotated a posteriori from
the behavioral data.
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Traffic NoGo Go
density GW P S GW P S
No 7 0 153 155 163 10
Few 73 0 157 93 162 2
Many 136 0 160 26 163 1
Table 1
Number of trials with stop at the crossroads (NoGo decision)
and without stop (Go decision) with respect to the road sign
(Give Way: GW; Priority: P; Stop: S) and traffic density
(No, Few or Many vehicles). The total number of trials is
1461.
Go condition (see Appendix A, in italics). No differ-
ence appeared until 60 m, where significant differences
appeared when comparing the first (p = 0.025), second
(p = 0.025), third (p = 0.013) and fourth (p = 0.019) road
segments to the seventh (60-45 m). This marker is con-
sistent with the gas pedal curve: the push on the pedal
increases sharply 60 m before the crossroads (see Fig.
5)4.
Figure 5. Mean speed for each of four conditions (left axis)
and pressing (right axis) on the gas pedal (Give-Way Go con-
dition) and on the brake pedal (Give-Way NoGo condition),
as function of the distance to the crossroads. The whiskers
represent standards errors. For the vehicle speed, red: GW-
NoGo, orange: GW-Go, blue: Priority, green: Stop; for the
push on the pedal, solid line in black: gas pedal, dash line in
black: brake pedal.
The data was thus split into two road sections, at 60
m from the crossroads. In the following, the first six
road segments (150 to 60 m before the crossroads) are
referred to as the Before section, and the last four road
segments (60 to 0 m) are referred to as the After section,
according to before and after the prior decision in the
Give Way condition.
A systematic interaction was found between the Po-
sition and the Driving Situation (see Appendix B),
which shows a consistency between the behavioral and
oculomotor data (see Fig. 6 for the saccade amplitudes
and Fig. 7 for the fixation durations).
Figure 6. Mean values of the saccade amplitudes as a func-
tion of the Position and Driving Situation. The whiskers rep-
resent standards errors.
Figure 7. Mean values of the fixation durations as a function
of the Position and Driving Situation. The whiskers represent
standards errors.
Main results
On each section, four ANOVA have been conducted
for saccade amplitudes and fixation durations, on the
mean values (F1) and the mean slopes (F2). In the
Before section, three modalities were considered for
the Driving Situation: Give Way, Stop and Priority.
In the After section, four modalities were considered:
GW-NoGo, GW-Go, Stop and Priority. The results of
planned contrasts are presented in Appendix C.
The “Before” road section. In the analysis of saccade
amplitudes, a significant effect was found on the mean
values, F1(2,66) = 27.365, MSE = 0.006, p < .001, h2 =
0.453, with amplitudes higher in the Give Way condi-
4 Newman-Keuls tests were also conducted on the brake
pedal data in the GW-NoGo condition (see Appendix A, in
non-italics). Significant changes appear 90m before the cross-
roads, when comparing the first (p < .001), second (p = 0.013)
and third (p = 0.045) road segments to the fifth (90-75 meters).
The change is less sharp however (see Fig. 5), so that we de-
cided to split the data according to the observed change in
the gas pedal behavior.
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Before road section
Situation Stop Priority GW
SA M 7.014 8.031 9.535
SD 2.280 1.601 2.811
M-slope 1.087 0.974 1.976
SD-slope 6.254 5.037 7.121
FD M 0.279 0.271 0.239
SD 0.057 0.049 0.044
M-slope 0.007 -0.076 -0.042
SD-slope 0.094 0.082 0.089
After road section
Situation Stop Priority GWGo GWNoGo
SA M 8.222 8.412 9.146 9.592
SD 1.881 2.035 2.423 1.569
M-slope 12.268 -7.759 -10.398 11.780
SD-slope 12.452 15.615 10.000 20.518
FD M 0.254 0.277 0.226 0.222
SD 0.050 0.049 0.040 0.043
M-slope -0.173 0.042 0.181 -0.108
SD-slope 0.181 0.177 0.208 0.165
Table 2
Means of saccade amplitudes (SA) and fixation durations
(FD) according to the Position and Situation experimental
factors, in terms of mean values (M; degree for SA and sec-
ond for FD) and mean slopes (M-slope; degree/150m for SA
and second/150m for FD), with the associated standard de-
viation (SD and SD-slope). The Table on Top refers to the
Before position, the bottom one to the After position.
tion than in the Priority condition, and higher in the
Priority condition than in the Stop condition (see Tab.
2 for the means and standard deviations, and Fig. 8
for an illustration of contrasts). No significant effect
was found on the mean slopes, F2(2,66) = 0.955, MSE
= 0.043.
The analysis of fixation durations showed a signifi-
cant effect for the mean values, F1(2,66) = 21.765, MSE
= 0.001, p < .001, h2 = 0.397, with durations shorter in
the Give Way condition than in the Stop and Priority
conditions (no difference was found between these two
conditions). A significant effect was also found for the
mean slopes, F2(2,66) = 7.524,MSE = 0.008, p = 0.001, h2
= 0.186. The slopes were negatives in the GiveWay and
Priority conditions and close to zero in the Stop condi-
tion (see Tab. 2 for the means and standard deviations,
and Fig. 8).
The “After” road section. From the analysis of the
saccade amplitudes, a significant effect was found on
mean values, F1(3,99) = 11.552, MSE = 0.006, p < .001,
h2 = 0.259, with smaller amplitudes in the Priority
and Stop conditions compared to the GW-Go and GW-
NoGo conditions. A significant effect was also found
on mean slopes, F2(3,99) = 110.089, MSE = 0.206, p <
.001, h2 = 0.769. The slopes were positive in the Stop
and GW-NoGo conditions, and negative in the Priority
and GW-Go conditions (see Tab. 2 for the means and
SD, and Fig. 8).
From the analysis of fixation durations, a significant
effect was found on mean values, F1(3,99) = 26.044,
MSE = 0.001, p < .001, h2 = 0.441, with shorter fixations
in the GW-Go and GW-NoGo conditions than in the
Stop condition, and shorter in the Stop condition than
in the Priority condition. A significant effect was also
found on the slopes, F2(3,99) = 26.344, MSE = 0.032, p
< .001, h2 = 0.444. The slopes were positive in the GW-
Go and Priority conditions, higher in the GW-Go con-
dition, and negative in the GW-NoGo and Stop condi-
tions (see Tab. 2 for the means and SD, and Fig. 8).
The slopes were steeper in the After section
(for the saccade amplitudes: M = 0.0928.m 1, SD
= 0.0791.m 1; for the fixation durations: M =
0.0027s.m 1, SD = 0.0024s.m 1), compared to the
Before section (for the saccade amplitudes: M =
0.0392.m 1, SD = 0.0343.m 1; for the fixation dura-
tions: M = 0.0017s.m 1, SD = 0.0014s.m 1). This differ-
ence suggests a relative stability of the processes during
the Before section, while steep slopes indicate process
change during the After section.
Summary of the results. In the “Before” road section,
Table 2 shows that the highest saccade amplitudes and
the shortest fixation durations are found in the Give
Way condition (corresponding to the D process), which
is congruent with the hypothesis of a higher visual ex-
ploration during this process. The difference between
the Priority condition (C process) and the Stop condi-
tion (B), with higher amplitudes in C, may be due to a
higher level of subjective risk in the Priority condition,
related to the absence of interaction associated with the
NoGo decision in the Stop condition: with a lower risk
level, the process is closer to the Baseline.
In the “After” road section, shorter fixation dura-
tions were found in the Stop condition (compared to
the Priority condition) which is congruent with the an-
ticipation of the next decision in the Stop condition
(new D process). For the saccade amplitudes and fix-
ation durations, no difference was found on the mean
values between the GW-Go and GW-NoGo conditions.
Figure 6 shows that the curves intersect, suggesting
that the slope is a better description of the oculomo-
tor behavior in this case. Indeed, the slopes of sac-
cade amplitudes and fixation durations evolved in the
same way in the Stop and GW-NoGo conditions on the
one hand, and in the Priority and GW-Go on the other
hand. This can be seen as an increase in visual explo-
ration (intensification of D processes) in the first two
(Stop and GW-NoGo), and a decrease of visual explo-
ration in the other two (Priority and GW-Go).
Direct Prediction. Given that our main hypotheses
seem to be validated, it was interesting to test whether
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Figure 8. Mean values and slopes of saccade amplitudes and fixation durations according to the experimental factors, Situation
and Position. “*”: p-value of contrast <.05. The whiskers represent standards errors.
it was possible to predict the processes of the decision-
making task from the eye movement data. Using the
same methodology as Greene et al. (2012), we have
tested whether a Support Vector Machine (SVM, see
Vapnik (1998)) could learn and then estimate, above
chance, the subject, the Driving Situation (Stop, Prior-
ity, GW-NoGo and GW-Go conditions) or the Position
(Before and After sections).
We used the libSVM library, developed by Chang &
Lin (2011), with a Gaussian kernel with g = 2. Each
vector contains four components: saccade amplitude,
slope of saccade amplitude, fixation duration and slope
of fixation duration. We had two vectors for each par-
ticipant’s trial: one in the “before” and one in the “af-
ter” road sections. The data was normalized before
the learning phase. The cross-validation used 100 com-
ponents. The mean performance over these 100 com-
putations was 7.57% for guessing the subject (chance
was 2.94%) showing idiosyncratic oculomotor patterns,
46.30% for the Driving Situation (chance was 25%) and
71.25% for the Position (chance was 50%).
Given that the condition is not equivalent to a cog-
nitive process, we have also tested a simplified associ-
ation between Position, Driving Situation and process
(see Tab. 3), which is derived from the expected domi-
nant process according to the hypotheses under study.
From a 100-components cross-validation, we have
Stop Priority GW-Go GW-NoGo
Before B C D D
After D C C D
Table 3
In order to test the SVM, the three cognitive processes are
associated to Situation and Position experimental factors:
Baseline (B), Consolidation (C) and Differentiation (D).
found a prediction rate of 58.81% when guessing the
cognitive process, which is clearly above chance (33%).
Furthermore, we have also found that using the trends
(slopes) in addition to the mean values improves the
predictive power of the model: if one discards the
slopes, the prediction rate falls to 48.37%.
Discussion
The current study aimed to establish a link between
eye movements and decision-making situations un-
folding in time, associated with Differentiation (D) and
Consolidation (C). An experimental driving situation
was designed, where eye movements were described
with saccade amplitudes and fixation durations. An
increase of saccade amplitudes and a decrease of fix-
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ation durations are reported as an increase of visual
exploration. In order to analyze the data, a theoreti-
cal framework was introduced for the decision-making
task, consistent with the D / C theory (Svenson et al.,
2009).
In order to investigate the different processes of the
decision-making task (D, C, Baseline - B), the moment
and the value of the decision (Go/NoGo) have been
identified. Two factors were used in the analyses: the
Driving Situation (Stop, Priority, Give-Way Go and
NoGo) and the Position of the prior decision in the Give
Way condition, with respect to the crossroads.
In the Priority road sign condition, a C process was
expected. In the Stop condition, the process was ex-
pected to be closer to B. Indeed, the NoGo decision
(Stop road sign) does not lead to interactions with oth-
ers vehicles, unlike the Go decision (Priority road sign).
Then, when approaching the crossroads, the driver an-
ticipates the next decision (when to restart) with a new
D process. In the Give Way condition, the D process
was first needed, in order to make the prior decision
(Go or NoGo). Then, with a NoGo decision, a new D
process was expected, as in the Stop condition; with a
Go decision, a C process was expected as in the Priority
condition.
In the Before section, mean values of saccade ampli-
tudes and fixation durations showed that the highest
visual exploration was in the Give Way condition, con-
sistent with a D process. In contrast, visual exploration
was the smallest in the Stop condition, confirming a
process close to B. The mean slopes were quite flat in
this section, which means that in each condition, the
process was stationary.
In the After section, the visual exploration was
found to be more intensive in the Stop condition than
in the Priority condition. This switch of patterns com-
pared to the Before section is congruent with the pro-
cess change in the Stop condition from B to D. Mean-
while, the process seems to be closer to B than to C
in the Priority condition. In the GW-NoGo condition,
the oculomotor patterns show a D process as before the
prior decision. We understand this observation as in-
dicating a new D process, associated with the anticipa-
tion of the next decision, as in the Stop condition. In
contrast, the visual exploration dramatically lowers in
the GW-Go condition, with a profile similar to the Pri-
ority condition.
More generally, from the videos, we could see that
the gaze was mainly close to the vanishing point of the
roadway (“far point” for straight road), in agreement
with the literature (Donges, 1978; Land & Horwood,
1995; Salvucci & Gray, 2004). The drivers scanned the
other cars far away on the left and right when ap-
proaching the crossroads in the GiveWay and Stop con-
ditions, and looked at the cars waiting for them to pass
(at a shorter range) in the Priority condition.
Returning to our main hypothesis, we have found
it possible to discriminate visual attention processes at-
tached to a decision-making task, with eye movements.
Only minimal instructions (the same in all conditions)
were needed with respect to the decision-making task.
Additional cognitive processes occur in driving, and
there are inter-individual differences as well. The val-
idation of our main hypothesis despite this variability
suggests that our results are robust. Given that driving
is an everyday life activity, we hope that it will be possi-
ble to discriminate cognitive processes from oculomo-
tor patterns in other decision-making tasks (Kingstone
et al., 2008).
Finally, analyses were conducted in order to predict
these cognitive processes from eye movements. Greene
et al. (2012) have recently discussed Yarbus’ insight that
oculomotor patterns may allow the nature of the ongo-
ing task to be predicted, at least better than chance, and
surprisingly enough, they found no significant differ-
ence when comparing saccade amplitudes and fixation
durations in several visual tasks. Conversely, for a dif-
ferent set of tasks, Henderson et al. (2013) give evidence
that oculomotor data may be discriminant as far as the
visual task is concerned. Our data adds some input
to this discussion by predicting the process associated
with the decision-making task (58.81%, chance is 33%).
This encouraging result confirms that it is possible in
some conditions to evaluate above chance the cognitive
process from the current oculomotor patterns, even in
a complex situation, such as driving, where cognitive
processes cannot be imposed by explicit instructions.
Priority and Stop conditions
Based on the acceleration profiles in the GW-Go con-
dition, our data was cut into two sections, Before and
After the prior decision. An effect of these sections was
found in the Priority and Stop conditions, even if we
had no prior hypothesis that the associated processes
would change 60 m before the crossroads. In the Prior-
ity condition, the process changed from C to B, indicat-
ing that the decision-making task is over before pass-
ing the crossroads, as in the GW-Go condition. In the
Stop condition, a process change from B to D was ex-
pected (and found), due to the anticipation of the next
decision, when to restart. The fast changes of oculo-
motor patterns in the After section may be due to the
fact that when approaching the crossroads, the driver’s
gaze needs to select information from left and right, at
increasingly wider angles, leading to a higher visual
exploration. This increase of visual exploration during
the time course of the task also occurs in the GW-NoGo
condition.
Could we have anticipated that the process changes
in the Priority and Stop conditions would occur 60 m
before the crossroads, as in the GiveWay conditions? It
seems that at this point, the visual information is suf-
ficient to make the prior decision (stopping behavior)
or to focus on the next decision (restart behavior). We
may hypothesize that the driver, based on prior knowl-
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edge, estimates the best position to make the crossing
prior decision which is needed to start action. Indeed,
before this position, the visual information may not be
sufficient to anticipate correctly the future state of the
crossroads; after this position, a stop decision would
lead to an uncomfortable brake.
In order to examine this last idea, we considered a
scenario where a driver runs at 90 km/h (close to the
mean speed in our experiment), then brakes at 5 m.s 2,
which is near the limit of comfort. We found a stopping
distance of 62.50 m, consistent with this hypothesis.
Further experimentation, comparing novice and expe-
rienced drivers in the same situation, may help to vali-
date this learning hypothesis. It would also contribute
to a better understanding of the link between everyday
learning and associated behaviors (eye movements).
Mean slopes of eye-movement data as dependent
variables
We have proposed to use the mean slope of eye-
movement data (both saccade amplitude and fixation
duration) as dependent variables, and the statistical
analysis confirmed the relevance of these variables in
our experiment (see also Fig. 6 and Fig. 7). These
slopes describe how raw data evolve when approach-
ing the crossroads, and thus make it possible to dis-
criminate between stationary processes (where the raw
data remains roughly constant over time) and chang-
ing processes (where a global trend can be found in the
temporal evolution).
For instance, in the Diff/Con theory of decisionmak-
ing, one can hypothesize that the C process decreases
over time, while accumulating evidence for the final
decision (Svenson, 1992). This would be consistent
with the decrease of visual exploration we have found
in the After section, in the Priority and GW-Go condi-
tions. The idea that visual exploration may increase in
the D process when approaching the crossroads (in re-
lation to the next decision) also suggests an evolution
of the oculomotor patterns in the time course of the
decision-making task.
Conclusion
The main contribution of this study is that a bet-
ter understanding of cognitive processes associated
to a decision-making task can be extracted from eye-
movement patterns in a real-life situation. Trying to
determine the cognitive ongoing process from oculo-
motor patterns in everyday tasks is still in its infancy.
Further studies are needed in order to develop a full
understanding of the time course of decision making
in a greater variety of tasks and scenarios (e.g. in driv-
ing situations: overtaking, traffic lights, entering of mo-
torway). Yet, the ability to anticipate human decisions
would be highly advantageous in many domains, and
enable the development of new aids and systems.
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Appendix A
Newman-Keuls test for the
location of the prior decision
in the Give Way condition.
Position 150 135 120 105 90 75 60 45 30 15
classes -135 -120 -105 -90 -75 -60 -45 -30 -15 -0
150-135 .474 .420 .141 ? ? ? ? ? ?
135-120 .874 .843 .711 .013 ? ? ? ? ?
120-105 .940 .909 .856 .045 ? ? ? ? ?
105-90 .932 .843 .828 .059 ? ? ? ? ?
90-75 .610 .782 .815 .822 .012 ? ? ? ?
75-60 .498 .572 .531 .574 .538 .041 .080 .001 ?
60-45 .025 .025 .013 .019 .055 .092 .919 .216 .001
45-30 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? .116 ?
30-15 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? .024
15-0 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Table A1
Newman-Keuls test (p values) comparing all pairs of posi-
tion classes. In italics (bottom left half of the Table): gas pedal
data, for the GW-Go condition; in regular (top right half of
the Table): braking pedal data, for the GW-NoGo condition.
The stars (?) stand for p< :001.
Appendix B
Global analysis
Four 42 ANOVAwere conducted on the mean val-
ues (F1) and on the mean slopes (F2) of the saccade
amplitudes’ logarithms and of the fixation durations.
These ANOVA tested the effect of the Driving Situa-
tion (GW-NoGo, GW-Go, Stop and Priority) and of the
Position (Before and After sections).
Significant effects of the Driving Situation were
found on the saccade amplitudes, F1(3,99) = 21.38,MSE
= 0.008, p < .001, h2 = 0.393; F2(3,99) = 77.33, MSE =
0.155, p< .001, h2 = 0.701. For the Position, a significant
effect was found on the mean values, and a marginally
non-significant effect on the mean slopes, F1(1,33) =
6.95,MSE = 0.009, p = 0.013, h2 = 0.174; F2(1,33) = 4.05,
MSE = 0.205, p = 0.052. Significant interaction effects
were found, F1(3,99) = 16.61, MSE = 0.005, p < .001, h2
= 0.335; F2(3,99) = 83.85, MSE = 0.129, p < .001, h2 =
0.718 (see Fig. 6).
Significant effects of the Driving Situation were also
found on the fixation durations, F1(3,99) = 32.42, MSE
= 0.001, p < .001, h2 = 0.496; F2(3,99) = 15.04, MSE =
0.019, p < .001, h2 = 0.313. For the Position, a signif-
icant effect was found on the mean values, but not on
the mean slopes, F1(1,33) = 7.54,MSE = 0.001, p = 0.010,
h2 = 0.186; F2(1,33) = 1.19, MSE = 0.028. Significant
interaction effects were found, F1(3,99) = 12.47, MSE =
0.001, p< .001, h2 = 0.274; F2(3,99) = 24.49,MSE = 0.025,
p < .001, h2 = 0.426 (see Fig. 7).
A significant difference was found between the two
Give Way conditions (Go and NoGo) for the mean
values (not for slopes) in the Before section (both for
saccade amplitudes and fixation durations). This ef-
fect was not expected and more investigations were
needed. We found that the effect was due to the “few
vehicles” condition. Without these trials, Student’s t-
test comparing GW-NoGo and GW-Go conditions in
the Before section was not significant: T(66) = -1.754, p
= 0.436, for the saccade amplitudes; and T(66) = -1.754,
p = 0.909, for the fixation durations.
Trials with “few vehicles” were those where the de-
cision task is more complex. In contrast, in the “many
vehicles” condition, the final decision is often to stop
(see Tab. 1), while participants almost always passed in
the “no vehicle” condition. One explanation could be
that people become quickly aware of the higher com-
plexity of the “few vehicles” condition, and depend-
ing on their skills, some drivers may have chosen to
defer their prior decision. In this case, their visual ex-
ploration would have been reduced, as has been ob-
served for both saccade amplitudes and fixation dura-
tions. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that despite
of the increased complexity of this task, the results are
consistent with our main hypotheses, thus emphasiz-
ing their robustness.
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Appendix C
Planned contrasts
Results of planned contrasts on the ANOVA pre-
sented in theMain Results section, which compared the
Driving Situations Give Way, Stop and Priority in the
Before road section, and the Driving Situations GW-Go,
GW-NoGo, Stop and Priority in the After road section.
Deg Avg F p
Before S vs. P 1 0.13937 27.04751 <.001
Error 33 0.00515
P vs. GW 1 0.02884 4.67711 0.03791
Error 33 0.00617
After S vs. P 1 0.02526 5.41869 0.02620
Error 33 0.00466
GWGo vs. GWNoGo 1 0.01133 1.10373 0.30108
Error 33 0.01027
GW vs. P 1 0.19709 62.85244 <.001
Error 33 0.00314
Table C1
Planned contrasts on mean values of saccade amplitudes.
Road signs are Stop (S), Priority (P) and Give Way (GW).
Deg Avg F p
After S vs. GW NoGo 1 0.04905 0.20233 0.65579
Error 33 0.24244
P vs. GW Go 1 0.16382 1.046346 0.31379
Error 33 0.15656
S/GWNoGo vs. P/GWGo 1 67.69819 310.7287 <.001
Error 33 0.21787
Table C2
Planned contrasts on mean slopes of saccade amplitudes.
Road signs are Stop (S), Priority (P) and Give Way (GW).
Deg Avg F p
Before S vs. P 1 0.00112 1.60648 0.21386
Error 33 0.00070
S/P vs. GW 1 0.02954 41.43032 <.001
Error 33 0.00071
After S vs. P 1 0.00916 8.73856 0.00571
Error 33 0.00105
GW Go vs. GW NoGo 1 0.00028 0.30771 0.58283
Error 33 0.00090
S vs. GWGo/GWNoGo 1 0.02104 28.77295 <.001
Error 33 0.00073
Table C3
Planned contrasts on mean values of fixation durations.
Road signs are Stop (S), Priority (P) and Give Way (GW).
Deg Avg F p
Before P vs. GW 1 0.02042 2.98115 0.09359
Error 33 0.00685
S vs. P/GW 1 0.09943 10.95056 0.00227
Error 33 0.00908
After S vs. GW NoGo 1 0.07276 3.28384 0.07907
Error 33 0.02216
P vs. GW Go 1 0.32723 8.39987 0.00662
Error 33 0.03896
S/GWNoGo vs. P 1 0.75679 19.44325 <.001
Error 33 0.03892
Table C4
Planned contrasts on mean slopes of fixation durations.
Road signs are Stop (S), Priority (P) and Give Way (GW).
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